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Abstract
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  add  further  knowledge  to  the  research  on
organizational evolution, concerning managerial cognition and organizational innovation
activities. In our view, managerial cognitions are an essential link between organizational
activities  and  developments  in  the  business  environment.  Managerial  cognitions,  in
combination  with  an  organization’s  alignment  with  industry  recipes,  fundamentally
influence on how an organization is able to balance between explorative and exploitative
innovation activities. Pursuing this balance is essential for organizations in order for them
to adapt to changes in their business environment and thus survive and succeed in the long-
run.  We  construct  a  historical  case  study  on  Genentech,  one  of  the  first  and  largest
biotechnology  companies  in  the  world,  to  depict  how  explorative  and  exploitative
innovation  activities  evolve  alongside  senior  management  cognitions.  Our  descriptive
approach  presents  a  nuanced  view  of  the  dynamic,  context-specific  and  sometimes
conflicting issues behind the coevolution of organizations and the business environment.
We expand on the key factors behind Genentech’s extraordinary performance in bringing
new health care solutions to market. Finally, we offer five propositions on how managerial
cognitions might generally direct organizational innovation activities.
KEYWORDS:  managerial  cognition,  innovation  management,  coevolution,
exploration, exploitation, biotechnology2
Introduction
Innovation  activities  are  in  the  very  core  of  the  pharmaceutical  business.
Pharmaceutical companies have to be able to discover, develop and market new drugs in
order to stay ahead of the strong competition. As drugs can usually be easily copied, it is
very hard for a single company to protect its competitive position after its patents expire
without creating new offerings. The development of biotechnologies, which can be seen as
a continuous stream of interlinked innovations, has hugely impacted on the ways drugs are
discovered in the pharmaceutical business, and ultimately on the whole industry recipes.
Founded in 1976 in the United States, Genentech has continuously been on the forefront of
this development, making it a fruitful target for case research.
In the strategic management literature, there has lately been interest in the evolution
of  organizations  –  how  organizational  adaptation,  performance,  and  survival  are
intertwined with the developments in the business environment. It has been suggested that
organizations need to adapt by balancing between explorative and exploitative innovation
activities  in  order  to  survive  and  succeed  in  the  long  run  (March,  1991).  Another
perspective  that  has  recently  gained  prominence  emphasizes  the  role  of  senior
management, and managerial cognition in particular, in defining how organizations are able
to  adapt  to  their  changing  environment  (Garud  &  Rappa,  1994;  Kaplan,  Murray,  &
Henderson,  2003;  Tripsas  &  Gavetti,  2000).  Managerial  cognition  can  be  seen  as  an
intermediate  element  between  organizations  and  “developments  in  the  society  and
technology, and the structure, ideology, and the systemic properties of the firm” (Lamberg
& Tikkanen, 2006).
However, there has been little research on the possible role of managerial cognition
in  the  adaptation  of  organizations  through  balancing  between  different  innovation
activities. In this paper, we analyze how managerial cognitions are related to the success of
balancing  between  explorative  and  exploitative  innovation  activities.  We  study  how
Genentech,  its structure and processes, have co-evolved with the business environment,
focusing on the cognitions of its top management and analyzing the key factors that have
enabled  Genentech  to  keep  bringing  innovative  health  care  solutions  to  market.  We
conclude by offering five propositions on how managerial cognitions might generally direct
organizational innovation activities.
This paper continues by providing a theoretical background for our research. First
we outline a framework that is used to construct an account of the evolution of Genentech.
Before the case analysis, we shortly go through some essential managerial issues related to
the pharmaceutical industry. We then describe how Genentech’s managerial cognitions and
innovation  activities  have  evolved  in  tandem  with  the  development  of  the  business
environment,  concluding  with  a  summary  of  the  essential  factors  behind  Genentech’s
success. Finally, we propose how managerial cognitions influence on firms’ innovation
management and offer guidance for future research.
Theoretical Background
Understanding  innovation  activities  is  a  key  strategic  concern  for  everyone
interested in firms’ survival and performance in the long run. Two different  innovation
activities,  which  involve  different  types  of  knowledge  and  capabilities,  have  been
suggested: exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). In this paper, exploration refers to
firm behavior characterized by search for, discovery of, and experimentation with new
alternatives. Exploitation refers to firm behavior characterized by efficient use, refinement,
and extension of current knowledge, resources, and capabilities.3
It has been argued that the long-run success of a firm requires balancing between
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991). Exploration enables firms to remain open for
new alternatives, create new products and win over new customers. Exploitation, however,
is needed for building efficiency and ensuring the short-run success of the firm. Successful
organizational adaptation to changes in the business environment requires organizations to
balance  between  these  two  types  of  innovation  activities  (Kyriakopoulos  &  Moorman,
2004;  Levinthal  &  March,  1993;  Lewin  &  Volberda,  1999).  Two  basic  strategies  for
achieving the balance have been suggested: “ambidexterity” (Benner & Tushman, 2003),
which  refers  to  the  synchronous  pursuit  of  both  exploration  and  exploitation  through
organizational  differentiation,  and  “punctuated  equilibrium”  (Burgelman,  2002),  which
refers to the pursuit of balance through cyclical periods of exploration and exploitation.
The research on managerial cognition (for an overview, see (Walsh, 1995)) offers a
potentially insightful perspective for understanding why and how firms engage in balancing
their explorative and exploitative innovation activities in certain ways. It is suggested that it
is the senior management team that mediates between external forces for innovation and
change and internal inertial forces (He & Wong, 2004; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli,
1992). The top management  makes decisions regarding the organizational structure and
processes that guide the innovation activities toward exploration and exploitation, either
simultaneously or successively. While some studies have  been conducted analyzing the
role of managerial cognition in organizational adaptation and evolution (e.g. (Garud  &
Rappa, 1994; Kaplan et al., 2003; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000)), there is little knowledge on
the  effects  of  managerial  cognition  on  firms’  balance  between  different  innovation
activities.  Smith  and  Tushman  (2005)  studied  how  the  top  management  manages
innovation streams by dealing with “strategic contradictions”. They argue that balancing
contradiction  in  decision  making,  for  example  between  exploration  and  exploitation,  is
rooted in senior team cognitions. However, while explicating on the roles of cognitive
frames and processes in managing strategic contradictions, they remain silent about how
the  cognitions  ultimately  affect  the  choices  that  lead  to  differences  in  the  innovation
activities.  This  study  contributes  to  understanding  the  role  of  managerial  cognition  in
guiding the balance between organizational exploration and exploitation.
The roles of managerial cognition in organizational adaptation are highly complex.
The  managers’ mental models may lead  managers to overlook important  environmental
changes (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992) and underestimate the importance of exploring new
alternatives. The mental models may also be geared toward explorative learning, as can be
observed for example in the scientific research communities whose members are starting
their careers in the pharmaceutical business.
It is important to note that, in addition to the decision making process being social
in nature, the decisions behind business operations are always made by individuals with
‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1955). Thus, firm’s actions and finally the conceptions of
these  actions’  outcomes  are  first  filtered  through  managerial  cognition.  To  better
understand the workings of these cognitions, it is good to review some basic assumptions
offered by Lindell et al. (1998):
  Thinking and acting are mutual and intertwined processes;
  Experienced  top  managers  develop  rather  stable  belief  structures  or  strategic
ways-of-thinking regarding how to develop, manage and lead an organization;
  Mental structures function in a holistic mode and are a mix of cognition, values
and emotions, an assumption which means that this perspective might be labeled
‘socio-cognitive’.
In their discussion of organizational adaptation, Barr et al. (1992) use the concept of
mental models to refer to the tools that managers use to interpret and make sense of the4
information they receive. They argue that as these models are based on limited managerial
cognitions, they will be incomplete and their inaccuracy will increase as their environment
changes.  As the  basis of cognitive research, Barr et  al.  introduce three ways  in  which
mental  models  cause  a  mismatch  between  the  available  data  and  the  processing  of
information:
  Managers will tend to focus on the data that most supports their current views and
may, therefore, miss vital new data.
  Data will be interpreted according to the manager’s current mental model, leading
to a failure to see the need for change.
  The manager will have a limited scope of alternatives as they are in part, blinded
by the boundaries of their current mental model.
Organizations  operate  in  an  environment  where  there  are  certain  legitimized
industry recipes that are collectively shared among industry practitioners (Spender, 1989).
These recipes are constructions of the institutionalized, collective rationales behind certain
‘right’ ways of conducting business in the given environment. On the one hand, following
the industry recipes gives organizations legitimacy for their actions, and they become more
easily accepted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Innovation activities that closely follow the
industry recipes can be characterized as exploitation of current knowledge and capabilities,
usually aimed at improving existing offerings. On the other hand, breaking away from the
standard  solutions  gives  organizations  the  possibility  to  create  disruptive  innovations
(Tushman  &  Anderson,  1986)  that  organizations  try  to  pursue  through  explorative
innovation activities.
Thus,  in  our  framework  of organizational  adaptation  (see figure  1),  managerial
cognition is an essential link and filter between developments in the business environment
and  the  structure  and  processes  of  an  organization.  Managers  are  constantly  making
assessments  of  the  status  of  the  organization  vis-à-vis  the  status  of  the  business
environment. These assessments, whether conscious or more subconscious, can either be
aligned with or opposing to the existing industry recipes. Eventually the assessments lead
to actions and outcomes, which determine the balance between explorative and exploitative
innovation activities. In our view, this balance is essential for the long-run success and
survival of organizations.5
Figure 1. Framework of organizational adaptation through balancing between
exploration and exploitation.
Methodology
We selected the case method (Stake, 1995) for our exploratory research because we
wanted a deep understanding of the possible cognitive issues behind the evolution of a
single organization. Although the influences of managerial cognition are limited only to
this single case, we believe that this study allows other researchers to build on and validate
our findings in different settings.
Using our framework of organizational adaptation, we conducted a historical case
study  of  the  organizational  evolution  of  Genentech.  Our  primary  data  source  for
discovering the changes in the structure and processes of Genentech, and especially in the
mental  models  of  the  firm’s  senior  management,  was  the  firm’s  annual  reports.  This
methodology is supported by Barr et al. (1992), who studied the cognitive changes in two
U.S. based railroad companies by using letters to stockholders to map the managers’ mental
models. Although not ideal, the annual reports provide a good view of the major actions
that have taken place while also reflecting some of the prevailing thinking of the senior
management. Genentech’s annual reports were available to  us for the years 1982-2005
although the company went public already in the year 1980. The missing information for
the years 1980 and 1981 was largely covered up in the book ‘From Alchemy to IPO’ by
Cynthia  Robbins-Roth  (2000).  The  book  also  provided  information  about  Genentech’s
development  for the years it was still privately owned and thus not obliged to official,
regulated reporting practices. In addition, we selectively used press releases and material
from the company’s website to check factual issues such as dates and figures. To get more
deeply  into  the  analytical  discussion  surrounding  the  companies,  we  scanned  through
dozens of articles by such quality papers as the Pharmaceutical Executive; the articles that
we quoted directly are listed in the references.
We  constructed  the  top  managers’  cognitions  from  the  source  materials  by
analyzing, first, the actions undertaken by Genentech and, second, what was said about the
intentions and strategies behind those actions.  We then compared that  data against our
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understanding of the evolving business environment. By triangulating the collected data
against  interviews  with  several  biotechnology  specialists  we  aimed  to  validate  our
reasoning  and then adjust the  interpretations accordingly. To  minimize the researchers’
influence and biases, we first systematically registered the events and clues of cognitive
changes  from  the  annual  reports  in  spreadsheets.  From  the  collected  data  we  built
descriptions of the evolution of the firm. Based on the descriptions and the spreadsheets,
we mapped a chronological path of the evolution, which proved helpful in discovering the
top managers’ cognitions. However, because of space limitations, in this paper we can only
present an overview of the evolution.
Innovation Management in Biotechnology – Case Genentech
Biotechnology companies have developed solutions for many different fields since
the  advent  of the  industry in the  1970s.  Our  paper  focuses  on  human  health care,  but
biotechnology  companies  are  involved  also  in  other  areas  such  as  enhancing  product
processing in the pulp and paper industry. In the pharmaceutical sector, there have been
huge changes in the operations of different actors in the last three decades, and much of
that change is believed to be brought on by the development of the new biotechnologies.
Schweizer  (2002)  identified  three  essential paradigm  shifts:  from random  screening  to
focused screening; from hit-or-miss clinical trial programs to tailored products to a specific
patient  subsegment;  and  from  mass-market  –centric  paradigm  to  consumer-centric
paradigm.
Managing a biotechnology company successfully requires the acknowledgement of
several issues characteristic to the industry. In his study of the key drivers and success
factors  for  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  biotechnology  industry,  Schweizer  (2002)
describes  the  organizational  structures  of  typical  biotech  firms  in  the  following  way.
Internally,  they  compose  of  overlapping  interdisciplinary  project  teams  with  minimal
hierarchy.  The  firms  have  merged  academic  practices,  and  often  culture,  with  the
requirements of a high-tech industry in order to create a lean and effective organization for
drug discovery and commercial development. Costa et al. (2003) found that, historically,
most  of the  new  biotechnological  innovations  have  been  introduced by  young  science-
based SMEs. Evidently, the start-ups have lacked the full range of relevant skills needed to
develop therapeutic drugs in-house, so they have turned to numerous forms of collaboration
such as joint ventures, research agreements or licensing agreements. Costa et al. also state
that these smaller companies often do not possess, and find difficulties in accessing the
necessary  skills  especially  in  the  strategic  management  and  marketing  areas.  Few
companies are able to grow enough to manage the whole process of drug development and
marketing,  to  become  a  fully  integrated  pharmaceutical  company.  Instead,  they  must
choose to either operate in the supporting sectors or align themselves somewhere within the
drug discovery continuum.
Genentech  has  been  on  the  forefront  of  the  biotechnology  development.  It  has
contributed to the changing ways of thinking and acting in the pharmaceutical industry.
Next we will describe the environment and the factors that have enabled the company to
effectively manage this continuous stream of innovation. The evolution of Genentech has
been  divided  into  four  different  periods:  1976-84:  Scientific  Exploration;  1985-90:
Focusing on Commercialization; 1991-98: Regaining Explorative Innovation; and 1999-
2005: Balanced Growth.7
1976-84: SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION
Genentech  was  founded  in  1976  by  venture  capitalist  Robert  A.  Swanson  and
biochemist Dr. Herbert W. Boyer. Swanson brought with him the entrepreneurial spirit
generated  in  Silicon  Valley,  which  enabled  them  to  focus  on  productivity,  not  on
establishing  corporate  guidelines  or  other  secondary  measures.  At  that  time,  most
professionals in the pharmaceutical business worked in large companies which had their
own habits and often rather bureaucratic routines. Few entirely new entrants had come to
shake the industry recipes. Swanson’s new approach was oblivious to the demands of the
old professionals. Boyer, then, was one of the first to perfect the technology of recombinant
DNA, a major milestone in the relatively short history of biotechnology. The new venture
got initial funding of $100,000 from the investment group Kleiner & Perkins (K&P), where
Swanson was employed before his new position. Benchmarking firms from other Silicon
Valley industries rather than other pharmaceutical companies, he started Genentech as a
virtual company out of the K&P offices. As a group of academics and scientists, assisted by
an intellectual property law specialist, they put together the first contract research deal that
gave the new biotech company product rights. The initial experiments to generate proof-of-
concept  data  for  the  technology,  which  were  a  classical  example  of  truly  explorative
innovation activities, were conducted in the labs of Boyer at the University of California at
San Francisco and Keichi Itakura and Art Riggs at City of Hope National Medical Center
in Duarte, California.
When  this  first  project  showed  that  genetic  engineering  in  fact  could  induce
microbes to make  foreign proteins, the founders and their  financial backers  moved the
company  into  its  own  labs  in  a  South  San  Francisco  warehouse.  The  scientists,  most
employed right out of academia, worked in a very ascetic environment. They were all
driven by science and were extremely motivated on achieving results that would make a
profound  difference  to  patients.  The  management  had  realized  that  in  order  to  lure
advanced scientists, the corporate culture must support their needs. Even though the work
was intense, the employees got their own free time for doing off-project research or simply
having fun. The atmosphere combined business instincts with cutting edge science but left
no room for the big pharma mentality of enjoying the benefits of the past block-buster
drugs.
Then, on October 14, 1980, Genentech Inc. was taken public. It was stated to be the
first  company  to  focus  all  of  its  attention  on  using  the  tools  of  the  new  biological
knowledge  to  create  products,  and  it  was  the  first  to  successfully  scale  up  protein
manufacturing to support large quantities needed for clinical trials and marketing. At the
time, the general press focused mainly on Genentech’s interferon and its cancer-fighting
properties, which naturally caused much investment interest and even hype. While cancer
was a growing concern for the western nations, traditional pharmaceutical companies had
not been able or even that enthusiastic to create new solutions for cancer care. Partly with
the help of the cancer hype, the initial public offering raised $35 million, an incredible
amount for a company with no products on the horizon until 1984. By 1983, approximately
a dozen companies had followed the same route until the IPO window closed for a few
years.
Many  of  the  early  biotech  firms  were,  in  their  excitement  about  the  potential
applications of the new technologies, unable to focus their development efforts. In other
words, they were engaged in a continuous cycle of explorative innovation. The scientists’
work was rewarded by new inventions, and they were reluctant to give up producing new
solutions. Strategically it would probably have been better if at least some of the scientists
would  have  focused  on  developing  certain  inventions  further,  to  exploit  the  existing
knowledge in order to create marketable products. Genentech’s 1981 annual report shows8
interest in three different product categories: industrial chemicals, animal health and human
health care. It was not until after 1983 that the company focused exclusively on human
health – pharmaceuticals clearly had the best potential for return on investment. In addition
to  creating  new  technologies,  Genentech was  innovative  also  in partnering.  Back  then,
partnering was not as common as it is today. Pharmaceutical companies were not used to
partnering with small knowledge intensive firms. Genentech sold its worldwide rights to
recombinant human insulin to Eli Lilly & Co, a deal which spawned the very first biotech
therapeutics to reach the marketplace in 1982, and rights to their human growth hormone to
AB Kabi. Hoffmann-La Roche, which would complete a merger with Genentech in 1990,
also bought the marketing rights to its interferons in 1980. These deals, among with several
others,  gave  the  young  biotech  firm  cash  to  support  its  growth,  and  assurance  to  the
investors that biotechnology indeed was real and valuable. They also enabled the firm to
show net income already in 1979, and it has continued to do so ever since.
Finally, in 1985, it was time for Genentech to advance from an R&D boutique to a
real pharma company – to sell drugs. This kind of rapid transformation to a fully integrated
pharmaceutical company had been unforeseen at the time, and it has since been very rare.
Genentech retrieved  the  U.S.  marketing  rights  to  human growth hormone  in 1983  and
obtained approval from the Food and Drug Administration in late 1985. That year it also
hired its first 75 sales representatives.
In  sum,  the  period  of 1976-84  was  a  time  of  intense  scientific  exploration  for
Genentech. The founders realized that it is possible to develop new biotechnologies and
finally discover drugs successfully using only small research groups. Traditionally it was
believed that practically everything related to pharmaceutical research and development
requires  tremendous  human  and  financial  resources.  By  partnering  with  big  pharma
companies both in R&D and marketing, Genentech was rather quickly able to learn the
whole process from drug discovery to selling drugs to customers. After Genentech’s IPO in
1980, its market valuation remained relatively stable till 1985. At that time the investors
were still patient enough to wait for future sales – they believed in Genentech’s product
pipeline.
1985-90: FOCUSING ON COMMERCIALIZATION
After seeing that it can successfully sell its own targeted therapies to small patient
populations, Genentech continued building its sales force. The top management recognized
that they had come to a situation were they could realize some of the built up potential in
their  research  and  development.  The  company  even  made  a  buy-out  of  two  R&D
partnerships that had shown large commercial potential. Genentech’s research efforts were
guided toward exploiting its earlier knowledge, developing products based on its earlier
scientific achievements. The drugs would benefit relatively small patient populations that
could be reached with a compact but well-equipped (utilizing portable computers already in
the mid-1980s) sales force. CEO Bob Swanson outlined the marketing strategy in 1986 as
follows: first, Genentech would bring products to market in the U.S. under its own label;
second, it would market those same products overseas through agreements; third, other
products that did not fit the core categories would be capitalized on by licensing them to
key partners. Although ambitious, this strategy did not directly attack the long-established
pharma corporations who where mostly after the so-called blockbusters that required huge
marketing resources aimed to a great extent directly to consumers.
This period was the first time Genentech was really beginning to make profits from
its own products. Before this time, a major effort was put on finding alternative ways of
funding the drug development. However, while the sales were steadily growing, Genentech
had lost focus in its R&D operations and stopped introducing new drugs in the late 1980s.9
The management had gotten so excited over the sales expansion opportunities that their
attention and emphasis was now clearly on exploiting the company’s existing capabilities
rather than developing new breakthrough ideas. The investors made their own conclusions
about the hollow product pipeline, which sent the stock price down and finally made the
company a takeover target. In 1990, a traditional Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche
Holdings saw the opportunity and invested more than $2 billion in Genentech. The two
companies had already worked together in selected research projects in the early 1980s, so
the managers at Roche acknowledged the potential Genentech held in its drug discovery
resources.
1991-98: REGAINING EXPLORATIVE INNOVATION
Arguably the  most  influential partnership  in  Genentech’s  history,  the  deal with
Roche gave Genentech, which was then being lead by a newly appointed CEO Kirk Raab,
cushion to once again take on long-term R&D projects without constant fear of running out
of funding. From the financial point of view, the deal gave Genentech tremendous security.
The company has since spent  record shares of its revenue in long-term R&D projects,
which  was  in  major  part  enabled  by  the  Roche  arrangement.  As  indicated  by  several
specialists we interviewed for this study, the pharmaceutical business is essentially about
taking and managing calculated risks. As an example, Genentech designed its oncology
clinical trials to prove that its drugs could prolong life, which is considered a very high bar
for an experimental cancer treatment to reach; most companies seek only to prove their
drugs can shrink the size of a tumor. Although having been troubled for the last few years,
the  newly  invigorated  R&D  departments  were  now  pushing  through  multiple  new
innovations.
We believe it is fair to say that this time the signals for change came from external
sources, outside Genentech. It is not unheard-of that new firms rely too much on their first
innovations  and then are unable  to  re-focus on explorative  innovation activities  after  a
period of strong commercialization and growth efforts. Genentech had already shown that
not  everyone  needs  to  follow  the  industry recipes  in the  pharmaceutical  business.  The
scientists, other developers, and the sales teams proved that drug development and sales
could be conducted successfully with smaller resources. However, after the initial stir-up,
the company was becoming too comfortable with its current operations. It  had stopped
exploring.  Roche recognized that  Genentech had  skills and capabilities which were not
fully  utilized,  and  set  a  new  track  for  the  company  which  emphasized  the  need  for
explorative innovation.
In the 1992 annual report Raab admitted that they did not exactly know what the
relationship  with  Roche  would  bring  forth,  but  by  that  time  they  had  developed
“meaningful mutual respect and productive relationships.” The arrangement was said to
provide opportunities in “marketing of each other’s products, international cooperation,
product  development  and/or  manufacturing  support  and  significant  research
collaborations”. Right before Arthur Levinson took over Kirk Raab as CEO in 1995, Roche
negotiated a five-year extension on its option to purchase the balance of the company. This
extension gave Levinson unusual freedom to invest in the company’s pipeline, because the
terms put a floor and a ceiling on where Genentech’s stock could go in the next five years.
This meant that Levinson could aggressively spend on explorative R&D without fear that it
would  depress  the  stock’s price.  Because  pharmaceutical companies  were  and  still  are
valued in the stock market largely based on their anticipated new products, this new turn
set the stock price on a steady rising course.10
1999-05: BALANCED GROWTH
Then in June 1999, Roche exercised its option that caused Genentech to redeem all
of its outstanding stock not owned by Roche. In July, 44 million shares were offered under
the new trading symbol “DNA” in the largest initial public offering of its kind in the U.S.
healthcare  industry  history.  These  arrangements  created  Roche  billions  in  profits,  and
today, Roche Holdings still owns 56 percent of Genentech. The partnership with Roche has
given Genentech financial security and access to international product development and
marketing resources. Probably the most crucial decision for the success of the partnership
was that Genentech was left operationally independent. Roche did not interfere with the
everyday management of Genentech. It has enjoyed full-scale resources without losing the
innovation capabilities of a flexible organization.
This did not mean giving up on marketing. On the contrary: the business end was
given more focus and effort. As PharmExec (2005, Oct 1) put it in a recent article: “If the
first act of Genentech’s story was mostly about the science, act two will be focused on
business.” While this comment refers more to the current issues, the seeds were planted in
the  beginning  of  Levinson’s  CEO  post.  Levinson  broadened  the  commercialization
strategy:  first,  Genentech  would  grow  current  products  by  additional  claims  [for  new
indications] and by increasing customer base; second, they would maximize new product
launches and reduce time to peak market share; third, they would expand product offerings
and increase the depth of each of their therapeutic area; and fourth, they would further align
discovery and development with evolving market needs. Genentech started to become a
credible and skilled marketer in the U.S. As an evidence of this development, Roche had
agreed to have its Roferon-A promoted by Genentech in the U.S. in 1996.
While not abandoning the targeted therapies strategy completely, Genentech’s new
R&D innovations were now aimed at much broader patient populations than before. They
were moving into the big players’ blockbuster arena with their newest oncology product,
Avastin. It has been described as a platform drug (see PharmExec, 2005, Oct 1) because it
uses a method [suppressing angiogenesis by directing an antibody at vascular-endothelial
growth factor, slowing down tumor growth] that is not limited to just a certain type of a
cancer. It was first approved in February 2004 to treat patients with first-line metastatic
colon or rectum cancer, but studies have shown that it is efficient against other types of
cancer as well. From a commercial point of view, these different tumor types may seem
like new  markets, but  it allows a drug with several indications to be sold by the same
representatives, potentially offering a major saving. In addition to the platform method,
PharmExec (2003, Feb 1) raised a certain sense of urgency as Genentech’s top competitive
advantage  in  launching  new  drugs,  meaning  that  its  medical/scientific  excellence,
aggressive commercial execution and seamless organizational alignment together enable
the  company  to  quickly  focus  on  developing  a  product’s  potential.  Genentech’s
commercialization capabilities are becoming comparable to those of traditional big pharma,
but with a sales force of less than 1000 employees, the efficiency of their focused efforts is
still remarkably better.
During this last period from 1999 to 2005, Genentech’s total product sales have
rocketed from about $1 billion to $5.5 billion. Its share price, adjusted for splits, has ten-
folded since 1998 till 2005. During those years, the only major setback in Genentech’s
market capitalization growth was in 2001 and 2002 when the company’s most anticipated
product Avastin got into unexpected troubles in the FDA approval process. The drug has
since proved to be a huge success. In the end of 2005, the company also  had multiple
promising drugs in all the phases of its product pipeline. It  seems that, during the last
period,  Genentech  finally  succeeded  to  effectively  balance  between  exploring  new
alternative treatments and exploiting the commercial potential of its existing products.11
SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION OF GENENTECH
Much  has  changed  in  the  thinking  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry  practitioners
because of biotechnology, and Genentech has been at the leading edge of this change.
Especially in the early days, Genentech’s most notable cognitive innovations were related
to  the  concept  that  small  can  be  competitive  also  in the  pharmaceutical  industry.  The
company founders realized that they could develop new biotechnologies and then use those
technologies  to  discover  drugs  in  small  research  groups.  They  also  believed  in  the
commercial  feasibility of targeted therapies  to  small  patient  populations  and  that  these
drugs could be marketed without a huge sales force. At the time, the industry was entirely
dominated by big pharma companies that had enormous resources for R&D and sales. They
were content with using the inefficient, traditional random-screening discovery processes
and then marketing the resulting drugs to doctors and distributors with thousands of sales
representatives and massive advertisement campaigns. To support the growth of the already
large  organizations,  they  were  only  interested  in  finding  the  next  blockbuster  drug  or
copying the success of others, ignoring potential new treatments with fewer users. Now that
Genentech had reached to the list of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, its top
management  answered  to  the  stockholders’  ever  growing  sales  demands  with  a  new
solution: platform drugs such as Avastin. Avastin’s research was focused on a very narrow
target but, as it turned out, it has a much wider potential target  base because  it can be
expanded into multiple indications. While big pharma was still aiming for single-indication
blockbusters, Genentech’s platform approach enabled it to keep clinical trial costs and sales
forces smaller. With platform drugs it could continue serve patients that carried some other
than the most common diseases, while creating sufficient profits.
We  argue  that  much  of  Genentech’s  success  and  distinguished  role  in  the
pharmaceutical  industry  is  attributable  to  the  cognitions  of  its  top  managers  and  their
impact on the innovation activities. The cognitions have enabled such a balance between
explorative and exploitative innovation activities that has resulted in strong, growing sales
and a continuous stream of truly innovative offerings. Genentech’s senior management has
largely avoided the common misperceptions and bounded views of the industry, which has
enabled the company to constantly adapt and renew its strategy. Through different periods
in the firm’s evolution, the managers have learned to orchestrate the firm in a constantly
developing business environment. In 1976-1984, the senior management guided Genentech
strongly  against  the  established  industry  recipes  by  emphasizing  truly  explorative
innovation. This enabled the newcomer company to gain a position that was much more
powerful than its economic size would have predicted. In 1985-1990, the managers focused
on exploiting the innovations from the first period. While this enabled Genentech to grow
its sales, the lack of exploration caused troubles for future sales and market valuation. In
1991-1998, with the help of Roche’s financial backing and strong international presence,
Genentech’s  research  and  development  was  again  pointed  heavily  toward  exploration.
After that, in 1999-2005, the senior management of Genentech has been able to balance
well between exploration and exploitation, without being bounded by the industry recipes.
A summary of the evolution of Genentech is provided in the following table.12
1976-84
Scientific Exploration
1985-90
Focusing On
Commercialization
1991-98
Regaining
Explorative
Innovation
1999-05
Balanced
Growth
Managerial
Cognitions
  It is possible to develop
the new biotechnologies
using small research
groups
  Late phase drug
development requires
additional resources from
partners,
commercialization
without partnering is not
possible yet
  Most profits go for
the companies that
market and sell drugs
  Genentech can
market targeted
therapies, not
blockbusters, on its
own to compete with
big pharma
  Pharmaceutical
companies are largely
valued for their product
pipelines
  Genentech needs to
focus on its core
capability, which is
still drug development
  The financial cushion
from the Roche deal
allows taking
calculated risks in
R&D
  Cancer can be made a
treatable disease in a
decade
  Investors’
expectations for
growth have
increased
because of the
new public
offering
  Platform drugs
are potential
alternatives for
competing with
traditional
blockbusters
Exploration /
Exploitation
Balance
  Heavy emphasis on
exploring the new
biotechnologies and
developing new drug
candidates
  Lacking the skills and
resources for exploiting
the developments
commercially
  Emphasis on
commercialization of
the existing drug
developments
  Building the
necessary resources
for marketing the
drugs
  Re-emphasis on risk-
taking explorative
innovation without
forgetting to enhance
the commercialization
capabilities, including
efficient clinical testing
  Continuing the
strong R&D
efforts, special
focus on
platform drugs
  Developing the
commercializati
on skills further
Genentech
vs. Pharma
Industry
  Changes in the industry
R&D and partnering
practices: a small firm
develops drugs through
the early phases, larger
firms develop them
further and
commercialize
  One of the first new
firms to enter the
drug selling market.
Before this there
were practically no
new entrants
  Exceptional
competitive advantages
in biotechnology and
drug development
  The Roche deal allows
high R&D expenditure
  Genentech has
developed a new
kind of a
platform drug
and efficient
marketing
resources
Performance   No own drugs on the
market
  Profits from licensing the
technologies
  Market capitalization
stable
  Sales starting to grow
  Not enough new
drugs in the drug
development pipeline
  Market capitalization
rising at first, then
going down because
of the hollow
pipeline
  Sales continue to grow
moderately
  The drug development
pipeline becomes more
promising
  Market capitalization
on a rising course
  Sales growing
rapidly
  The platform
drug enables
new products
efficiently
  Market
capitalization
rising rapidly
Table 1. Identified periods in the evolution of Genentech.13
Conclusions and discussion
As suggested by our framework on organizational adaptation, and building on the
insights  of  Smith  and  Tushman  (2005),  managerial  cognition  influences  on  how
organizations  balance  between  different  innovation  activities,  namely  exploration  and
exploitation.  Managerial cognition works  as  a  filter  between business  environment  and
organizational  structure  and  processes,  affecting  managerial  decision  making  and  the
following actions and outcomes. The case of Genentech reveals how managerial cognition
might  direct  organizational  innovation  towards  either  exploration  or  exploitation  or
alternatively towards either ambidexterity or punctuated equilibrium (table 2). Next we
discuss  the  discovered  influences  of  managerial  cognition  on  innovation  activities  and
make five preliminary, generalized propositions. Naturally, our list of propositions is not
meant  to  be  all-inclusive.  The  propositions  introduce  simplified  mechanisms  by  which
decision making related to innovation activities is expected be directed.
When the top management of Genentech perceived that the company’s technologies
for drug discovery were superior to those of their competitors, they quickly decided that
they should out-license the technologies and sign agreements for further co-development
with larger companies in order to move forward in the drug discovery continuum. It was
only after they realized this superiority that they shifted the emphasis from exploratory
innovation to finding ways to profit from their current technological capabilities. Because
of the ambiguity of comparing different types of technologies or products with each other,
and the lack of market mechanisms for more objective judgments, we argue that the timing
of the innovation shift was highly dependent on managerial cognition. Thus, we offer the
proposition that
P1. The managerial cognition that competitors are technologically behind
and  do  or  will  have  worse  products  on  market  directs  decision  making
toward emphasis on exploitation.
It is common practice in the pharmaceutical industry that  companies are valued
largely  based  on  their  product  pipelines  –  anticipated  future  drugs  or  other  products.
However, because the market capitalization is not a direct measure of the product pipeline
and the information flow between analysts, investors, and managers is always incomplete,
the top management has to interpret how the investors perceive the company’s competitive
situation. In the late 1980s, the senior managers of Genentech were slow to notice that the
investors began to appreciate less the company’s product pipeline. The value of the stock
plummeted before the management took corrective action toward explorative innovation.
P2. The managerial cognition that investors perceive that competitors are
technologically more advanced and they have or will have better products
on market directs decision making toward emphasis on exploration.
Specifically in the pharmaceutical industry, but possibly in some other technology-
intensive industries as well, it is commonly seen that only the established companies can
truly move to exploit the technologies they have invented. In this paradigm, smaller firms
can only function as research and development boutiques, focusing almost exclusively on
explorative  innovation,  resulting  in  high-risk,  future-oriented  technologies.  Often  these
firms  set  their  strategies  toward  becoming  targets  for  acquisitions.  However,  one  can
reasonably argue that the firms could also shift to exploit their technologies in one way or
another: Genentech choose to license its technologies to larger companies, creating profits
from early on.
P3.  The  managerial  cognition  that  the  current  position  in  the  product
development  network  does  not  allow  commercialization  directs  decision
making toward emphasis on exploration.14
Some  of  the  managerial  cognitions  work  toward  finding  balance  between
exploration  and  exploitation  via  either  punctuated  equilibrium  or  ambidexterity.
Genentech’s management started to emphasize ambidexterity, simultaneous pursuit of both
exploration and exploitation, during the period from 1991 to 1998 when it perceived that
the company had enough financial resources to engage in explorative research for finding
novel solutions for cancer treatment while maintaining steady growth of sales of current
products.  Before  this  period  the  top  management  had  concluded  that  in  search  for
efficiency their  limited resources had to  be allocated,  at  least  to  some extent, to  either
explorative or exploitative innovation.
P4. The managerial cognition that the organization has enough resources
and capabilities to both explore and exploit directs decision making toward
finding balance via ambidexterity.
After Genentech’s early strong focus on developing advanced technologies, the top
management saw in the late 1980s that it had become imperative for the success of the
company to put most effort to commercializing the existing technologies and products in
development. The management became occupied with the pursuit of exploitation, when just
years  earlier  they  had  believed  in  little else  than  breakthrough  science  in research and
development.
P5.  The  managerial  cognition  that  either  exploration  or  exploitation  is
currently  imperative  directs  decision  making  toward  finding  balance  via
punctuated equilibrium.
Toward Exploration Toward Exploitation
Managerial Cognitions   Competitors are technologically equal or
more advanced and they have or will have
better products on market
  Investors perceive that competitors are
technologically more advanced and they have
or will have better products on market
  Current position in the product development
network does not allow exploitation
  Competitors are technologically behind
and they do or will have worse
products on market
  Investors perceive that competitors are
technologically behind and they do or
will have worse products on market
  Current position in the product
development network allows
exploitation
Toward Punctuated Equilibrium Toward Ambidexterity
  Not enough resources and capabilities to both
explore and exploit
  Either exploration or exploitation is currently
imperative
Managerial Cognitions
  Toward
exploration…
  Toward
exploitation…
  Enough resources and capabilities to
both explore and exploit
  Both exploration and exploitation are
simultaneously necessary
Table 2. Managerial cognitions directing decision making related to innovation
activities.
The  main  theoretical  contribution  of  this  study  is  to  elaborate  on  the  dynamics
between managerial cognition and different innovation activities, namely exploration and
exploitation. It is shown how the mental models of senior management are changing in
accordance with the developments in the business environment. These mental models, in
turn,  influence  on  how  an  organization  balances  between  explorative  and  exploitative15
innovation activities. While these mechanisms can never be fully explored or explicated,
researchers can discover and share insightful perspectives on them through descriptive case
studies.
The literature on organizational adaptation has stayed relatively silent about how
managerial cognition affects balancing between exploration and exploitation. Through a
single case study, we have shown what kind of effects managerial cognition might have on
managing innovation activities. Although our results are only preliminary and need more
empirical analysis with other longitudinal material, we highlight that managerial cognition
should  not  be  ignored  when  studying  how  organizations  evolve  in  changing  business
environments. As the human element is always strongly present, previous research has in
many cases missed explanatory opportunities by ignoring the role of managerial cognition.
Considering practice, managers would be able to better avoid the common pitfalls
in  long-run  innovation  management  if  more  research  was  conducted  on  the  role  of
managerial cognition in balancing between exploration and exploitation. We believe that
research  can  identify  cognitive  biases  that  commonly  occur  in  the  management  of
innovation activities.  Our  analysis  already discovered  potential ways  of  how  managers
place  under  or  over  emphasis  on  certain  types  of  innovation  activities  under  certain
conditions. In addition, our study provides managers with naturalistic material that they can
relate with and draw implications for their own managerial practice
While we are confident that this study provides a valid and insightful perspective on
managerial cognition related to organizational evolution in the case of Genentech, it was
certainly a limitation that we could not get closer to the management and the practical
operations of the firm. Because of the difficulty of combining in-depth cognitive analysis
with  an  evolutionary  perspective  over  a  long  time  period,  we  suggest  two  research
approaches to be combined in the future. One should focus on the longitudinal evolution of
an organization in its institutional and competitive landscape while the other should take a
more cultural approach to interpret the social action of the members of an organization in
its  natural  settings.  This  kind  of  pluralistic  methodology  would  allow  for  a  deeper
understanding  of  the  complex  phenomena  of  managerial  cognition  in  organizational
evolution.16
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